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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RONALD C. ELLIOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
14388

-vsEARL N. DORIUS, Director,
Driver License Division,
Department of Public Safety,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ronald C. Elliott, appeals from
the affirmation by the Honorable Judge Maurice Harding in
the Fourth District Court for Utah County, of two orders
given by respondent revoking appellant's driver's license
pursuant to Utah's Implied Consent law, Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended (hereinafter all references
to Utah Code Ann. or U.C.A. are to the Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The two orders of revocation dated October 28,
1975, in this case, were consolidated for trial since
they were both similar in facts. The revocations were for
the failure of appellant to take a sobriety test as
provided under Utah's Implied Consent law.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 41-6-44.10.
The District Court with the Honorable Maurice
Harding presiding upheld the revocation and found that
appellant refused to submit to a chemical test as required
in the statute and as provided by the officer.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the Fourth
Judicial District in and for Utah County should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the facts as set forth
in the appellant's brief with the following additions and/or
corrections.

(Note that the references in this brief are

made to the original record of transcript as counsel for
the appellant in stating his facts has provided no references
to the record anywhere in his brief.)
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First, counsel for the appellant stipulated that
there was probable cause for the officers to arrest the
appellant in the first incident for driving under the
influence (R.7).

This stipulation occurred just as

officer Durrant was about to describe appellant's attempt
at taking the field sobriety tests.
Second, officer Durrant informed the appellant
that the blood test was not available "after the implied
consent law was read and before his reply" (R.12).
Third, as pointed out on page three of appellant's
brieff the appellant was at the intersection in the second
incident which occurred less than four hours after the
first.

The appellant's car lights were one, the engine

was running, and the radio was on.

Officer Storrs testified

that he had to "yell at him approximately four time before
he even Looked up. at us, and he . . . we-asked him to shut
his engine off and he reached over to put it in gear, and
officer Burnham reached in and pushed it back into park so
he couldn't drive off." (R.17).
turned the car off (R.18).

Officer Storrs finally

Later, at the police station,

officer Storrs administered some field tests to the appellant.

Officer Storrs testified, "His balance was real

poor" (R.18).
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Finally, appellant's counsel stated on page three
of his brief that appellant "could not contact a lawyer."
There is no showing from the record that appellant made
an effort to call a lawyer.

He did not request one. He

did not ask that one be present.

The record shows only

that he made some calls (R.21).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1." Whether or not the arresting officer complied
with the statutory requirements concerning the advice of
rights under Utah's implied consent law.
2.

Whether or not the appellant refused a

reasonable and proper request to submit to a chemical
sobriety test, thereby making the revocation order proper.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ARRESTING OFFICER FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS WHEN INFORMING APPELLANT OF HIS
RIGHTS UNDER UTAH'S IMPLIED CONSENT LAW.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 provides for revocation
of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a sobriety
test.

The applicable statutory provisions are:
"(a) Any person operating a
motor vehicle in this state shall
be deemed to have given his consent
to a chemical test of his breath or
blood for the purpose of determining
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the alcoholic content of his blood,
provided that such test is administered
at the direction of a peace officer
having reasonable grounds to believe
such person to have been driving in an
intoxicated condition. The arresting
officer shall determine within reason
which of the aforesaid tests shall be
administered.
*

*

*

(c) If such person has been placed
under arrest and has thereafter been
requested to submit to any one of the
chemical tests provided for in subsection
(a) or (b) of this section and refuses to
submit to such chemical test, the test
shall not be given and the arresting officer
shall advise the person of his rights under
this section. Within twenty days after
receiving an affidavit from the arresting
officer to the effect that such person has
refused a chemical test the department
shall notify such person of a hearing before
the department. If at said hearing the
department determines that the person was
granted the right to submit and without
reasonable cause refused to submit to such
test, or if such person fails to appear
before the department as required in the
notice, the department shall revoke for one
year his license or permit to drive. Any
person whose license has been revoked by
the department under the provisions of
this section shall have the right to file
a petition within thirty days thereafter for
a hearing in the matter in the District
court in the county in which such person
shall reside. Such court is hereby vested
with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty
to set the matter for trial de novo upon ten
days' written notice to the department and
thereupon to take testimony and examine into
the facts of the case and to determine whether
the petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this act."

_c;_

Appellant's counsel relies on Gassman v r Dorius,
543 P.2d 197 (1975), for the position that a person's
"implied consent rights" must be given to him after his
refusal.

Other jurisdictions have decided contra on

this point.

State v. Twiss, 192 Neb. 402, 222 N.W.2d

108 (1974); State v. Hill, 221 S.E.2d 398 (1976).
Also, the fact situation in Gassman, supra,
differed greatly from the case in chief.

In Gassman, after

the officer read Gassman his rights, both the officer and
Gassman chose the blood test.
blood test be administered.

They both agreed that the

It was chosen contemporaneously

with the reading of the rights.
breathazlyzer was given.

No explanation of the

One and one half hours later when

Gassman's physician could not be reached the officer requested
the breath.

There was no reading of his rights with this

request for the breath.

Gassman assumed he could still take

the blood test when the technicians arrived.

In the instant

case, only the breathalyzer was offered the appellant.

It

was offered immediately upon and contemporaneous with the
recitation of appellant's implied consent rights.
evident

It is

that appellant understood his rights since they

were read to him again during the second incident by Officer
Storrs who had been a witness when the rights were read to
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the appellant in the first, incident.

In fact, after the

rights were read to the appellant in the second incident,
he said, "we have already gone through this before" (R-20) .
POINT II
THE APPELLANT REFUSED A REASONABLE AND PROPER
REQUEST TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL SOBRIETY TEST THEREBY MAKING
THE REVOCATION ORDER PROPER.
The 1967 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(a)
included inter alia:

"The arresting officer shall determine

within reason which of the tests shall be administered."

This •

was inserted explicitly to contravene the effects of Ringwood
v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959); and Bean v.
State, 12 Utah 2d 76, 362 P.2d 750 (1961), which gave the
choice to the driver.
It was entirely reasonable for the officers in the
case in chief to request a breath test only.

Wayne R. McTague,

administrator for the American Fork Hospital, testified that
American Fork Hospital was not drawing blood for chemical
tests during the time in question.

This fact was explained

to appellant before he requested a blood test.
test was the only test available.

The breath

The American Fork Police

would be out of their jurisdiction in going to Provo, and it
would have been unreasonable for them to leave their post to
do so.
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It has been construed in many jurisdictions that
the purpose of a choice of tests is to select one that is
reasonably available.

The North Dakota statute, N.D.C.C.

§ 39-20-01 contains almost identical language as Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44.10(a) with regards to giving the officer the
determination of which test should be administered.

In

Clairmont v. Hjelle, 234 N.W.2d 13, at 15 (1975), the
Supreme Court of North Dakota declared that the purpose of
the statutory provision that the arresting officer shall
determine which test for intoxication shall be used is
"to permit the use of whichever test is readily available at
the time (often late at night) and place (often rural areas)
where the arrest is made."

Even in jurisdictions where there

is no specific choice given to the driver or the officer as
which test should be used, the key in the selection of the
test is that it be one that is "reasonably available."
v. Mastaler, 130 Vt.

44, 285 A.2d 776 (1971).

State

In the

instant case, the officer's request for appellant to take
the breath test was entirely reasonable as it was the only
available test.
In addition, appellant requested the blood test only
after the officers informed him that it was not available.
Even in states where the motorist has the choice as in Maine,
the state may suspend a person's license who requests a test
not available and refuses to take any other available test.

Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643 (Me- 1969).
Appellant seems to imply that the officers
had a duty to provide him with a blood test if he so
requested.
statute.

This view is plainly not supported by the

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (g) provides:
"The person tested shall be
permitted to have a physician of
his own choosing administer a
chemical test in addition to the
one administered at the direction
of the peace officer." (Emphasis
added.)
This opportunity was given appellant on several

occasions but he did not avail himself of the opportunity.
The statute puts no duty on the arresting officers or the
state to procure a physician for the driver.

Furthermore,

as pointed out in Smith v. State, Registrar of Motor
Vehicles, 40 Ohio App.2d 208, 69 Ohio Ops.2d 195, 318
N.E.2d 431 (1974) (a case strikingly similar to the case in
chief),

the right of a motorist to have a person of his

own choosing administer chemical tests for blood alcohol
level in addition to the test administered at the direction
of an officer is a statutory and not a constitutional
right;

thus, a refusal to allow a motorist to go to the

hospital to obtain a blood test after he had refused to
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take a breathalyzer test offered by an officer did not
preclude the suspension of the operator's driver's license.
There is no showing in the case in chief that
appellant ever got in touch with a doctor, and he made no
request for the officers to wait for a doctor.

In fact,

as admitted by the appellant, he never even tried to call
his doctor (R.40,41).
In Peterson v. Dorius, No. 13981 (Utah Supreme
Court, March 19, 1976), relied on by the appellant, this
Court pointed out "there might be reasonable causes to refuse
to submit to a chemical test. . . . "

There is no showing

that appellant's refusal was reasonable.

In fact, the test

requested by the officers was the only reasonable one under
the circumstances, and appellant's refusal to submit to it
was belligerent and unreasonable.

The reasonable cause

for refusal in Peterson, supra, was that she wanted to
wait for her lawyer.
Counsel for appellant further misconstrues
Gassman, supra.

On page 7 of his brief, the reference by

this Court that the breath test may well be thrown out was
mere conjecture, obviously given as dicta by this Court.
The breath test is fully authorized by statute and case
law in this state.

The plaintiff in Gassman, supra, did
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not challenge the validity of the test generally.

In fact,

as pointed out at 543 P.2d, at 198:

"He actually did not

refuse even the breath test. . . . "

He just refused to take

it from the officers for the reason that he did not feel
they would be impartial.

The appellant in the instant case

gave no reason to the officers for refusing the test except
to refer to it as an expletive deleted.

His reasons in

fact for refusing the breath test were that the officers had
informed him that it was the only test available, and they
could not offer him the blood test.
In addition, appellant's interpretation of
Gibbs v. Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah 1975), is entirely out
context.

That case dealt solely with the qualifications of

the person administering the blood test when that particular
test is used.

It sheds no light on the determination of which

test should be used in a given circumstance.

The quotation

from Gibbs on page 7 of appellant's brief beginning "there
are situations, . . ."is obviously intended by this Court
to be only hypothetical in nature and not an insistence on
the blood test in any particular instance.
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POINT III
THE LANGUAGE OF GASSMAN V, DORIUS SHOULD BE
RE-EXAMINED BY THE COURT TO RESOLVE AN APPARENT CONFLICT
WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(c) (1953), AS AMENDED,
WITH REFERENCE TO THE DUTY APPELLANT SEEKS TO IMPOSE ON
THE ARRESTING OFFICER IN ADVISING APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE AFORESAID SECTION.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (c) (1953) , as amended,
contains directions to an arresting officer in the event
that a person arrested for driving under the influence
refuses to submit to a chemical test of his breath or
blood, in the following language:
"If such person has been placed
under arrest and has thereafter been
requested to submit to any one of the
chemical tests provided for in
subsections (a) or (b) of this section,
and refuses to submit to such chemical
test, the test shall not be given and
the arresting officer shall advise
the person of his rights under this
section." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975)
(as noted in Appellants brief at page 6), this Court
indicated that the statute required an arresting officer
to read one's rights under the Implied Consent Law after
the refusal to take the test.

This ruling, at least

insofar as it may require a "reading" of one's rights,
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is in direct conflict with the statute which, as noted
above, only requires that the arresting officer "advise"
a person charged with driving under the influence of his
rights under the Implied Consent law.
The word "advise" is defined as "to give advice
to; to recommend (a course of action) to; to counsel;
warn.

To give information to; to apprise; inform."

Webster's Unabridged Dictionary.

Ballentine's Law

Dictionary, Third Edition (1969), says that "advise"
means "to give advice; to offer an opinion as worthy or
expedient to be followed; to counsel."
A review of the word "advise" in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 2A, indicates the
following court constructions:
". . .'advise' means to give
advice; to counsel; it is different
in meaning from 'instruct' or 'persuade'•"
Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 105
P.2d 494 (1940) .
"In an instruction that all persons
concerned in the commission of a crime,
whether they directly committed the act
constituting the offense, or aided or
abetted in its commission, or even if
not present at its commission, have
advised or encouraged its commission,
or principles in the crime so committed,
the word 'advise' means fto give-counsel;
to offer an opinion to as worthy or
expedient to be followed; to recommend
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as wise and prudent; or to suggest
as the course of action1 and the
term 'encourage• means 'to give
courage to; to excite to action or
perserverance1." State v. Allen,
34 Mont. 403, 87 Pac. 177.
In Hunter v. Adams, 4 Cal.Rptr. 776, 781, 180
C.A.2d 511, the Court said that advise means to warn, to
give notification or notice to, to apprise, to inform.
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully
suggested that in the instant case the individual was
given advice and was advised of his rights contemporaneously
with his refusal to take the chemical test and therefore
the statute was followed.
Furthermore, it is suggested that to the extent
that Gassman v. Dorius, op. cit., purports to require a
literal reading of the Implied Consent law to one who
refuses to submit to a chemical test as opposed to
advising one of one's rights under the act, it should
be overruled.

Great confusion has already resulted in

the courts of this State in considering implied consent
refusal trials de novo under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(c)
(1953), as amended, as such lower courts have sought and
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often applied this part of the Gassman decision literally
and even in cases where it was shown that the officer had
informed and advised a person as to the affect of the
refusal, the courts have refused to uphold the suspension
of a driver license by the defendant-respondent on the
grounds that Gassman requires a reading of rights
rather than the advice spoken of in the statute.

Such

a revision of the Gassman decision is necessary to
eliminate the conflict between the statutory language
and that decision.
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CONCLUSION
McCall v. Dorius, 527 P.2d 647 (Utah 1974}, and
Peterson, supra, do point out what this Court has stated
many times—that findings of the trial court, supported
by substantial competent evidence, will not be disturbed
on appeal.
As pointed out in this brief, it is not the
officer's duty to obtain the additional blood test requested
by the appellant besides the test the officers requested
him to take.

The officers offered him the only reasonable

test under the circumstances.

The officers clearly

reiterated to the appellant his rights on separate occasions.
The officers in short fully administered the requirements

{

of the statute.
The appellant was patently unreasonable in
refusing the breath test in light of his knowledge that it
was the only one available.

(

He gave no reason at the time

he was arrested for refusing the breath test.

Utah Code

Ann. § 41-6-44.10 is aimed specifically at the problem of

{

the recalcitrant inebriate who refuses to take a sobriety
test.

The conduct of the appellant during the time in

question comes squarely within the purview of this statute.
He was picked up two times in less than four hours.

<

Three

different police officers testified of his inebriated
condition giving them probable cause to make an arrest.

-16-

{

During the second incident the appellant was at the intersection slumped over the wheel with the lights on, the motor
running, and the radio playing.

Officer Storrs had to

shout at him four times to get his attention.

Yet, the

appellant was unable to give any explanation other than
drinking for his behavior.
The lower court correctly upheld the statute in
affirming the revocation.

Appellantfs appeal should

therefore be denied, and the order affirming appellant's
driver's license revocation should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
HARRY E. McCOY, II
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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